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I Introduction
Writing of the conflict known as the 'Troubles', which concerned the status of the six counties of Northern Ireland, Desmond Egan posed the "Northern Ireland Question": "two wee girls/were playing tig [sic] near a car…/how many counties would you say/are worth their scattered fingers?" 1 Years later, but too late for the 3,600 people who were killed in the conflict between proIrish 'nationalists' and pro-British 'unionists', 2 these two traditions answered this question with a resounding "none". By the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the use of violence for the furtherance of political goals was completely rejected. 3 The Agreement is comprised of two agreements: the first being between the Northern Irish political parties (Multi-Party Agreement) ; the second being between Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) (BritishIrish Agreement) . It outlines several developments aimed at securing peace and crosscommunity cooperation in Northern Ireland. Significantly, it poses an answer to another Northern Ireland Question: how can two opposing, yet equally legitimate, selfdetermination aspirations be recognised? The answer found in the Agreement is that "it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone" to exercise their right to self-determination to create a united Ireland should they wish, 4 provided that the choice "freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland" as to the territory's status would be respected. 5 Yeats' remarks on the failed 1916 Irish Uprising, that a "terrible beauty is born" 6 are an apt description of these provisions. Although the Agreement provided some answer to the 
II The Belfast Agreement

A Background
The Agreement was a peace agreement to bring an end to the conflict known as the 'Troubles'. 9 Although the conflict had complex routes, it was, at its core, a conflict of status, 10 sparked by an Irish civil rights movement. 11 Northern Ireland was, and is, part of the UK, and contains within it two communities divided by ethnicity, culture, religion and politics. The majority of the population are 'unionist'. 12 Traditionally of Protestant denomination, unionists identify as British and support Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK. 13 Nationalists, on the other hand, form an increasingly growing minority.
14 Traditionally Catholic and of Irish identity, nationalists support the creation of a united Ireland. 15 The Troubles occurred between 1969 and 1998, and resulted in over 3,600 deaths. 16 The British armed forces were deployed. Unionist and nationalist paramilitaries committed acts 7 Christine Bell and Kathleen Cavanaugh "'Constructive Ambiguity' or Internal Self-Determination? SelfDetermination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement" (1998) 22 Fordham Int'l LJ 1345. 8 Amy Maguire "Self-Determination, Justice, and a 'Peace Process': Irish Nationalism, the Contemporary Colonial Experience and the Good Friday Agreement" (2014) 13 Seattle J for Soc Just 537 at 563. 9 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 255-256. 10 At 1-2.
11 Rainer Grote "Northern Ireland" 
in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) vol 7 816 at [13] . 12 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1.
13 At 1.
14 David Young "Protestant-Catholic gap narrows as census results revealed" (11 December 2012) Belfast
Telegraph <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>. 15 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1-2.
of violence to push their agendas. Human rights violations were also committed by both the UK and Ireland. 17 Peace processes began in the 1990s, resulting in the Belfast Agreement. 18 The Agreement contains provisions on justice, human rights, governance and cross-border institutions. In contrast to the self-determination provisions, these have been analysed extensively.
19
The Agreement was reached not simply through State negotiations, but largely by the major Northern Irish nationalist and unionist political parties. 20 As previous conflict resolution attempts had largely excluded these groups, 21 this itself was a major development. The Agreement was accepted by the populations of both Ireland and Northern Ireland by referendum.
22
B The Agreement's Self-Determination Provisions
The self-determination provisions are contained in both the British-Irish Agreement and the Multi-Party Agreement. The provisions therefore represent not only an inter-State consensus, but also a social and political consensus, between the peoples of Northern
Ireland.
The Agreement acknowledges the legitimacy "of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of people of Northern Ireland" regarding the retention of ties with Britain or the formation of united Ireland, 23 Catholics is rapidly decreasing. 33 Fourth, the UK government has shown its willingness to permit self-determination referenda, as shown in Scotland. Taken together, these factors suggest that discourse surrounding self-determination and the Agreement will become increasingly important. In such discourse, the resolution of the Agreement's ambiguities will be crucial.
C The Agreement and Politics
The lack of precision within the self-determination provisions is unsurprising. 
III General Self-Determination
A Scope
Self-determination concerns the right of people "freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 33 Young, above n 14. 67 More than one people may exist within a territory. 68 As they "are the masters of the country", 69 and have the right to determine the status of destiny of the territory, 70 the determination of whether a group amounts to a people is crucial.
C Territorial Integrity
States who act in accordance with, and respect the right to, internal self-determination are entitled to the protection of their territorial integrity. 71 Territorial integrity limits external self-determination, as a general right of secession "would reduce to naught the territorial sovereignty and integrity of States and would lead to interminable conflicts and chaos in international relations."
72
D Referenda
The will of the people is best established through referenda. 73 As was observed by the opinion as a subsidiary means. 83 In the specific context of referenda, three points also serve to support the argument that the principles discussed below are custom, First, as self-determination is customary international law, 84 the rules of referenda must also be custom. To suggest otherwise would undermine the logical application of selfdetermination. Self-determination requires a genuine expression of the people's will, 85 and this is best determined through referenda. 86 As the principles relating to referenda, like self-determination as a whole, are aimed at ensuring the will of the people is freely and genuinely expressed, they form a subset of the law of self-determination. 87 As a matter of logic, the principles must be customary law, too.
Second, analogies may be drawn to international human rights law. With these general propositions in mind, State practice establishes that the following norms are principles of customary international law which will be relevant in a referendum under the Agreement.
Good Faith
That ambiguities in the Agreement must be interpreted in good faith is uncontroversial, as all treaties must be so interpreted. 95 The good faith rule has also been explicitly applied in a referendum context.
96
Good faith obligations require the resolution of differences by negotiations. adhere to "democratic standards of free expression and free will", 107 a position also echoed by other States before the Security Council and General Assembly.
108
Significantly, Russia's conduct in relation to Crimea also provides evidence of the binding nature of the norm. Rather than argue that the territory could be transferred without freely given consent, the Russian delegation argued that the referendum permitted the people of Crimea to express their free will, 109 and that the referendum was undertaken in "strict compliance with international law and democratic procedure, without outside interference and through a free referendum". 110 The fact that Russia refuted allegations of a breach of law by attempting to use the law to justify the referendum's legality only serves to emphasise the customary nature of the rule. 
Peacefulness
The Crimean referendum also highlights the requirement that the territory be at peace at the time of a self-determination referendum. whether government or otherwise, are present in the territory, some degree of undue influence over voters is inherent, meaning the expression of the people's will may not be free and genuine. 114 The requirement of a territory being at peace at the time of a referendum is also borne out in practice relating to other referenda 115 and academic opinion. 116 
Clarity
The requirement of clarity is twofold. First, the question asked must be as clear as The situation of human rights in the Sudan, above n 102, at [7] . 116 Wambaugh, above n 81, at 241. Notably, both Irish and UK municipal law support this proposition. Under Irish law, the government is restricted, on the basis of equality, from providing a particular side of the issue with public funding. 142 There is also authority from the UK to the same effect. 143 
International Observation
International observation is crucial to ensure that the international community will accept the result of a referendum. 144 It was called for as a condition of a referendum in the context of Bosnia-Hercegovina, so that the free will of the peoples could be properly obtained. 145 Particularly in the context of a post-conflict society, international scrutiny adds to the legitimacy of the outcome of any referendum. 146 As with many of the other principles discussed thus far, part of the international rationale for the unlawfulness of the Crimean referendum was the lack of international observation of it.
147
IV Self-Determination Post-Belfast Agreement
Thus far, the self-determination provisions of the Agreement have been outlined, as have key principles of the law of self-determination which will impact the exercise of the right under the Agreement. In combining these two sets of legal principles, the nature, extent and effects of self-determination in the all-Irish context can be established. In order to establish the nature of this right to self-determination, issues with the Belfast Agreement, and the mechanisms of the referendum under it, call for exploration. the two governments will not only make significant progress to ensuring lasting peace, but, should the circumstances arise where a self-determination referendum is to occur, they will have gone a significant way to creating conditions wherein it can be undertaken in more just, equitable and peaceful conditions, regardless of the outcome.
A Issues
The Unit of Self-Determination
The identification of the self-determination unit in the present case is a matter of great importance. Although the "people of the island of Ireland alone" have the right to bring about a united Ireland, 165 this cannot happen without the consent of the "people of Northern Ireland".
166
The "people of the island of Ireland alone" will include a population which is overwhelmingly in support of a united Ireland, as it includes persons from the Republic of Ireland. In recognising that the "people of the island of Ireland" may collectively bring about a united Ireland, the Agreement vests the right of external self-determination in this unit. The right to self-determination of people of the island of Ireland, however, is not absolute. Rather, it is inherently tied to the right of another self-determination unit, the people of Northern Ireland. Indeed, there will be cross-over between these two groups: a 161 Schabas and Fitzmaurice, above n 149, at 39. person who is a person of Northern Ireland will also be a person of the island of Ireland, although the converse will not always be true.
In this regard, the Belfast Agreement differs from the general law of self-determination. In the context of external self-determination in the all-Irish context, the provisions of the Belfast Agreement with regards to who constitutes a self-determination unit are lex specialis provisions -that is to say that by their specificity, they take precedence over the general law of self-determination. 167 This means that in the Irish context, the right to external self-determination does not vest in nationalists or unionists per se. Rather it invests in them as a collective.
That said, the fact that the nationalist and unionist populations both have characteristics of a people in their own right 168 per the customary international legal definition 169 is significant. Although the Agreement's provisions are lex specialis with regards to external self-determination, customary international law will remain relevant for matters that are not covered by it. 170 The Agreement's provisions relate only to external selfdetermination. Therefore, for the purposes of the internal right to self-determination, the nationalist and unionist populations still constitute different peoples, as they would in customary international law.
The point is not of mere academic interest. As the right of internal self-determination grants a right to peoples to take an active part in the political life of the State and to be free from discrimination, 171 this means that unionists and nationalists, in their own right rather than as collective, must be granted these rights internally regardless of the status of Northern Ireland.
The right of self-determination in the Irish context, therefore, operates in two ways. The first means by which the right operates is externally. 170 Fragmentation Study, above n 167, conclusion 9.
of Ireland, also share this wish. The second mechanism of operation is internal selfdetermination. Rather than attaching to the people of the island of Ireland, or Northern
Ireland, it attaches to the nationalist and unionist populations. As such, although nationalists and unionists are entitled to customary legal protection of their right to internal self-determination, the right to external self-determination is vested in the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and is not delineated on the basis of traditional customary international law divisions.
B Referendum Mechanisms
The nature and extent of the right to self-determination under the Belfast Agreement can only be properly understood by examining the mechanisms of the referendum envisaged in the Agreement. The Agreement is largely silent on the mechanisms of the envisaged referendum. However, by reference to customary international law, a fuller understanding of the referendum processes can be established. To do so beforehand is preferable, as it means the terms on which the Northern Irish people would be accepted into a united Ireland would be made fully known to them.
182
This is in keeping with the State's obligation to ensure that voters are fully informed of the implication of the referendum results. 183 Furthermore, to change the constitution at the time of a self-determination referendum would be contrary to best practice, as it would mean that voters would be voting on multiple issues in one referendum, 184 and the requirement of clarity would be greatly undermined. As the Irish parliament is not competent to legislate in respect of Northern Ireland, 185 these amendments would have to be done on the basis that they would have no force unless Northern Ireland were to become a part of a united Ireland.
(c) Voter eligibility
With regards to voter eligibility, only restrictions with a valid reason may be placed on the right to vote. 186 Particularly, residency requirements would be both lawful 187 and advisable. The right to self-determination is not vested in the inhabitants of the island of
Ireland, but in the people. 188 The implication of this is that those who are entitled to vote
are those who can demonstrate a permanent connection with the island of Ireland, not merely presence there, or even British or Irish citizenship. As such, imposing a restriction so that persons who are eligible to vote are only those who have resided on the island of Ireland for a time agreed by both States is a legitimate objective, so as to protect the interests of the identified self-determination units.
Even within the island of Ireland, restrictions on voter eligibility on the basis of residency will mitigate the risk, however marginal it may be, that the Northern Irish vote could be affected by nationalist migration to the North. Given the openness of the Irish border, there is a, albeit rather minimal, risk that persons of more extreme political views will attempt to 182 Humphreys, above n 175, at 84-85. affect referendum results by casting their vote on the opposing side of the border. This history of political tension is a sufficient local circumstance 189 to justify the imposition of an ordinary residence requirement, so that a person who has been residing in either Ireland or the North for an agreed period of time will have their vote counted in that territory, regardless of which side of the border they are on come polling day.
(d) The required threshold
As to the imposition of a threshold which must be met to ensure territorial change, a simple majority threshold is appropriate. Although State practice does not set a defined threshold which must be met, 190 thresholds of more than a mere majority are permissible, 191 although not advisable. 192 However, the Agreement, and the Northern Ireland Act, are not silent on the threshold which must be met: both state that territorial change will occur if a "majority" of voters favour it. 193 This shows that it is envisaged in the Agreement that a simple majority of the Northern and Republic votes would be a sufficient indication of the free will of the people so as to change Northern Ireland's status.
The imposition of a higher threshold, as occurred in Montenegro, 194 would be contrary to the Agreement.
(e) The question Finally, the question must also be determined. In order to meet the requirements of clarity and unambiguity, 195 the question posed on both sides of the border should be identical. As the Scottish referendum question 196 was so "exemplary in its clarity ", 197 it is proposed that the Scottish question be adapted so as to fit the Irish context, the suggested question being 196 Scottish Independence Referendum Act, s 1(2).
The Referendum
Two key issues will need to be addressed in relation to the actual referendum process: the first being the role of the States; the second the role of international observation.
(a) The role of the States
States should generally restrain from excessively campaigning for one outcome in a referendum. 198 The UK has stated that it has "no selfish strategic or economic interest in
Northern Ireland", 199 and the Agreement states in terms that it is for the "people of the island of Ireland alone… without external impediment" to determine Northern Ireland's status. 200 The implication of this is that both States should refrain from excessive campaigning in favour of one result or the other.
However, the role of Ireland is more complex. Although the UK has declared it has no interest in Northern Ireland's status, 201 Ireland has historically pursued a claim to it, in However, this proposition cannot be sustained. Maguire, above n 8, [555] [556] [557] Grote, above n 11, at [13] .
215 [483] [484] [485] [486] [487] [488] Northern Ireland Act. possible results, with there having been no prior discussion of a third possible outcome, it is "indisputable" that third options cannot be achieved.
218
C A United Ireland
The effects of a vote in favour of a united Ireland, on the other hand, are more complex. In this case, both governments are obliged to introduce legislation to enable a united Ireland. 219 Should the people of the island of Ireland vote for this option, many issues of law will arise.
Statehood
One of the key areas of concern in the exercise of external self-determination is the effects this has on international legal personality. In the context of the 2014 Scottish referendum, major scholarship was done on this matter. Where a right to diplomatic protection exists, there is also a common law duty on the Crown to exercise it in certain circumstances. Although there is no international obligation to pursue diplomatic protection, 247 the Crown owes a duty of protection to its citizens, 248 protection, 249 enforceable by judicial review. 250 That said, the executive retains a high degree of discretion as to the exercise or non-exercise of diplomatic protection.
251
VI The Wider Implications of the Belfast Agreement
The discussion of the Belfast Agreement thus far has focused on the interpretation of the Agreement in light of the general law of self-determination. However, the Agreement, as a piece of State practice, may also impact the general law of self-determination.
It is oft-stated that Northern Ireland is exceptional. Although this argument has been convincingly rejected, 252 there remains an exceptional innovation within the Agreement, in its mixing of international and constitutional law, so as to accommodate two competing self-determination goals.
253
Particularly innovative is the role that various actors have had, and will have, under the Agreement. To date, State practice has recognised that there is an obligation for States to enter into good faith negotiations with each other with regards to referenda in territories over which they both have a claim. 254 Customary international law also establishes an obligation on States to enter into negotiations with a territory wishing to become independent. 255 The Belfast Agreement, however, was reached by a mixture of both of these. The right to self-determination truly was given to the people, as it was the people themselves who determined the scope of their right, with the consent of both States. By recognising the legitimacy of nationalist and unionist aspirations, and forfeiting any vested interests in Northern Ireland, the UK and Ireland have created a settlement to a long and bitter conflict. Whilst the peace is uneasy and imperfect, few would deny that it is an 249 
Regina (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Secretary of State for
improvement to the conflict years. Should this approach be adopted elsewhere, it could have a significant impact on the way in which self-determination is realised in postconflict contexts.
Secession movements remain prevalent around the world, the Crimean crisis being the obvious example. Aside from the flaws in the Crimean referendum which have been already been noted, a comparison of the Belfast and Crimean mechanisms highlights the merits of the Belfast approach to self-determination. At a basic level, the two situations have similarities: two neighbouring States with historic and present interests in a territory, in which there are competing nationalist and unionist movements. Had the two governments involved in Crimea, particularly Russia, followed the approach adopted under the Belfast Agreement, the free will of the territory's people, on which Russia placed so much importance, 256 could have been properly obtained.
Given the reluctance of States to forfeit their territorial integrity, to expect such a result is idealistic. However, if States are prepared to do so, the people truly become the "masters of the country", 257 and the people "determine the destiny of the territory", 258 rather than having their destiny determined by it. The Belfast Agreement is a testament to this.
VII Conclusion
The Belfast Agreement is outstanding for having ushered in a new era of peace in Northern
Ireland. Although recent events have highlighted the fragility of this peace, 259 the Agreement has survived such difficulties before. Provided the parties recall their firm commitment to non-violence, and are resolved to act in good faith towards each other, such difficulties can undoubtedly be overcome again.
Through its provisions on self-determination, the Agreement recognises the legitimacy of conflicting aspirations as to Northern Ireland's status. Although ambiguous in parts, the Agreement, being a creature of the law, must be interpreted in light of it, which enables the resolution of any issues which may arise. 
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